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Note
Giving Repose to the Exhaustion Doctrine:
An Argument for More Exceptions to Exhaustion
of Administrative Remedies in the Context of the
University of Minnesota Grievance Procedure
Jennifer Callahan Berry*
In the past several decades, the field of employment law
has grown tremendously. Between 1960 and 1990, Congress
enacted two-dozen major employment law statutes;' and in the
twenty years between 1971 and 1991, employment litigation
increased by 430%.2 To cope with this explosive change, em-
ployers have sought alternative mechanisms to resolve disputes
and stay out of court. Once strictly a labor law phenomenon, al-
ternative dispute resolution (ADR) practices like mediation and
arbitration are proliferating in the employment law context.3
* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2000,
University of Washington. The author would like to thank editors Liz Crouse
and Ryan Stai for their time, efforts, and encouragement; and Carolyn
Chalmers for her keen insights and many reads. Special thanks to my hus-
band, Mike Berry, and to my parents Liz and Dan Callahan for their love and
support.
1. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000));
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (primarily codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.(2000)); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84
Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-75, 677-78, and 42 U.S.C.§ 3142-1 (2000)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-31, 633-34(2000)); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-
16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000));
Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C.§ 206(d)(1) (2000)).
2. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, FACT FINDING REPORT 112, 113-34 (1994).
3. See David H. Gibbs, Employment Survey Says that Major Companies
Increasingly Use Tailored Programs and Processes, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COSTS LITIG. 237, 237 (2001) (reporting that growing numbers of U.S. workers
are subject to mandatory and multi-step ADR policies).
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Employers have incorporated formal ADR practices into what
are becoming increasingly sophisticated grievance policies.
4
Now, disputes that would have gone directly to court are get-
ting there later or perhaps not at all. Employees who wish to
appeal an ADR decision may find that they can only obtain lim-
ited judicial review, if any.
The adoption of in-house grievance procedures and increas-
ing use of ADR practices present interesting questions regard-
ing how informal dispute resolution procedures mesh with pre-
established judicial structures like judicial review. This Note
explores some of these issues as they arise in relation to two re-
cent Minnesota Court of Appeals cases. Both Stephens v. Board
of Regents of the University of Minnesota5 and University of
Minnesota v. Woolley 6 involved university employees seeking
review of adverse employment decisions. After these cases,
some stages of the University of Minnesota's grievance process
are subject to judicial review by writ of certiorari, 7 while others
are governed by the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act
(MUAA) and are almost entirely insulated from any review.8
The University of Minnesota grievance process and judicial
review of university employment decisions are of particular
significance because the university is one of the largest em-
ployers in the state.9 Despite the number of employees, Minne-
sota courts and the state legislature are reluctant to weigh in
on university employment practices out of respect for its special
legal status under the Minnesota Constitution. 10 As a result,
university employment decisions are not subject to the same
type of review that decisions by other employers receive. As
4. See id. at 237-38.
5. 614 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
6. 659 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
7. See id. at 306; see also infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
8. See id. at 307-08; see also infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
9. In 2003, the University of Minnesota employed over 17,000 full-time
equivalent employees. Press Release, Program Evaluation Division, State of
Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor, Compensation at the University of
Minnesota (Feb. 17, 2004), at http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/2004/
0402sum.htm (offering an executive summary of a study by the same name).
10. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
11. Minnesota courts apply low-level review (by certiorari) to the employ-
ment decisions of other public employers as well. See, e.g., Dietz v. Dodge
County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992) (concluding that certiorari is
proper for a nursing home administrator's challenge to her employment ter-
mination by the county); State ex rel. Ging v. Bd. of Educ., 7 N.W.2d 544, 556
(Minn. 1942), overruled on another point of law by Foesch v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
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Stephens and Woolley demonstrate, Minnesota courts justify
this treatment by applying legal doctrine and review mecha-
nisms that are rooted in administrative law.12
Part I of this Note describes Stephens and Woolley in de-
tail, exploring the courts' reasoning and doctrinal support. Part
II considers the propriety of applying administrative law doc-
trine outside the administrative context. Part II also explores
some of the problems that arise when pre-established judicial
structures are forced onto informal grievance procedures. Part
II concludes that University of Minnesota employees' rights are
not sufficiently protected when low-level appellate review is
applied to the employment setting, where there is a risk of
fewer procedural safeguards, and where employees may bring
less bargaining power to the table. Part III proposes a solution
whereby courts carefully allow exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine when the interests of the individual employee out-
weigh administrative convenience.
I. STEPHENS AND WOOLLEY: LIMITING JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF THE UNIVERSITY GRIEVANCE PROCESS
A. STEPHENS V. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
In 2000, the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided Stephens
v. Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, in which a
former University of Minnesota employee sought review of the
university president and board of regents' decision to reassign
her and not to renew her employment contract. 13 The univer-
sity hired Georgina Stephens for the position of Associate Vice
President for Finance and Operations and Treasurer in 1997.14
No. 646, 223 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1974) (holding that certiorari is the only
method for review of school board decisions); Bahr v. City of Litchfield, 420
N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 1988) (finding that the proper vehicle for obtaining
judicial review of city's and police civil-service commission's promotion and
hiring procedures is by writ of certiorari). This Note argues that low-level judi-
cial review is particularly problematic for university employment decisions be-
cause the university enjoys greater autonomy as compared to other adminis-
trative agencies. However, one could argue that, for the reasons cited in this
Note, review by certiorari is inadequate as applied to all public employers'
employment decisions.
12. See infra Part I.
13. 614 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
14. Id.
512 [89:510
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
In 1999, one of Stephens's former coworkers alleged that
Stephens had engaged in conduct which made her unfit in her
present position at the university. 15 An ongoing investigation
revealed that Stephens had lied in submissions to a Minnesota
district court, failed to file income-tax returns for the three
years prior to her appointment, and neglected to disclose re-
quired information in bankruptcy petitions. 16 This conduct
made Stephens uninsurable under the university's fidelity-and-
crime insurance policy.17 On November 20, 1999, University
President Mark Yudof informed Stephens that it would be in-
appropriate for her to continue employment in her current posi-
tion. 18 On December 1, the university notified Stephens that
her contract-set to expire on June 30, 2000-would not be re-
newed.19 The university reassigned her to other duties pending
the expiration of her employment contract.
20
Stephens originally filed a grievance pursuant to the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Grievance Policy (UGP) with the Univer-
sity Grievance Office on November 8, 1999-the same day the
university interviewed her as part of the investigation into her
conduct. 21 Stephens later suspended her grievance pending the
outcome of the university's investigation.22 After receiving no-
tice of the university's decision to not renew her employment
contract, Stephens revived the grievance process by filing an
amended grievance.23 Pursuant to the UGP, a university griev-
15. Id.
16. Id. at 767-68.
17. Id. at 768.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The UGP applies to the "employment grievances of faculty, aca-
demic professional and administrative staff, civil service staff, and student
employees" of the university. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA GRIEVANCE POLICY 3
(2002) [hereinafter UGP]. It does not apply to nonemployees or employees in
collective bargaining units. Id. A grievance is initiated by filing a written
statement of the grievance with a university grievance officer "within 30 work
days after: (1) the action being grieved occurred or commenced; or (2) the
grievant received notice or had knowledge of the action being grieved, which-
ever is later." Id. § 5(1). "An employee's grievance must allege a violation of a
specific University rule, regulation, policy or practice pertaining to the em-
ployment relationship between the grievant and the University," including
terms of the grievant's employment contract, alleged violations of the UGP, or
discipline. Id. § 2(2). See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text for a list of
Stephens's claims.
22. Stephens, 614 N.W.2d at 768.
23. Id.
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ance officer scheduled a meeting between President Yudof and
Stephens for December 15, 1999.24 However, Stephens with-
drew from the grievance process one day before her scheduled
meeting with President Yudof.25 She then petitioned the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals for certiorari review of the university's
decisions to reassign her and to not renew her contract. 26 Spe-
cifically, Stephens's petition alleged that the university had
"defamed her, retaliated against her because of her public
statements regarding the university, violated her due-process
rights, and discriminated against her because she had filed for
bankruptcy."27 She also alleged that the university breached
her employment contract and violated its own policies by reach-
ing its decision to terminate in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.
28
The court of appeals held that a university employee chal-
lenging an adverse employment decision by the university must
exhaust the applicable grievance process before seeking review
of the decision by writ of certiorari. 29 Because Stephens with-
drew from the university grievance process before completing
Phase I, she could not appeal her reassignment or the univer-
sity's failure to renew her employment contract. 30 Only after
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. By writ of certiorari, a superior court may review the record and
decision of an inferior court or body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. See,
e.g., Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 289 (Minn. 1992). Certiorari is
generally the only method available for judicial review of a University of Min-
nesota employment decision. Shaw v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 594
N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); see also infra note 85 and accompany-ing text. The Minnesota Court of Appeals hears certiorari appeals from Uni-
versity of Minnesota employment decisions in accordance with Minn. Stat.§ 606.01. See Heideman v. Metro. Airports Comm'n, 555 N.W.2d 322, 324(Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
27. Stephens, 614 N.W.2d at 768.
28. Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals declined to address several ofStephens's other claims on the ground that she provided no legal analysis or
citation to relevant authority. Id. at 771 n.4.
29. Id. at 777.
30. See id. at 775. The grievance policy is comprised of four phases.Stephens's scheduled meeting with President Yudof was part of Phase I, which
consists of an informal meeting between the grievant and a university repre-
sentative, usually the person responsible for the action that is grieved. UGP,
supra note 21, § 6(1). The meeting is chaired by a university grievance officer,
whose goal is to facilitate grievance resolution through informal discussion
and negotiation between the parties. Id. § 6(3). If the grievant is unsatisfied
after Phase I, he or she may proceed to a Phase II informal meeting with a
university administrator, typically the supervisor of the person responsible for
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exhausting the university's internal remedies could Stephens
seek some sort of judicial review-most likely by writ of certio-
rari.3 1
In arriving at its holding, the Stephens court relied upon
two doctrines grounded in administrative law. First, the court
applied the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
which directs disputes involving administrative bodies to the
relevant administrative grievance process. Under the exhaus-
tion doctrine, a claimant may apply for judicial review only af-
ter exhausting any existing administrative process. 32 Second,
the court invoked the tenet that certiorari, a nonintrusive and
expedient form of judicial review, is the only review available
from quasi-judicial decisions made by administrative bodies.
33
B. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a judge-made
doctrine applicable to cases involving an administrative proc-
ess. 34 The doctrine developed out of several early twentieth cen-
tury cases in which plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against
administrative bodies.3 5 Specifically, the doctrine provides that
the action that is grieved. See id. § 7. Phase III consists of an evidentiary hear-
ing before a three-member panel. Id. § 8(1). When a grievant is dissatisfied
with the decision of a Phase III panel, he or she may proceed to Phase IV arbi-
tration. See id. § 8(7).
31. Stephens, 614 N.W.2d at 774. But see Lee v. Regents of the Univ. of
Minn. 672 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a university
employee is not limited to certiorari review when her claim does not involve an
inquiry into the university's decision to terminate her employment, but in-
stead involves the university's alleged noncompliance with a Phase III panel's
order). The court of appeals in Stephens indicated that certiorari review should
not be applied to statutory claims. Stephens, 614 N.W.2d at 771-75. In a later
opinion, when Stephens returned to the court of appeals to challenge the dis-
trict court's dismissal of her statutory claims, the court of appeals held that
statutory claims are similarly exempt from the exhaustion requirement articu-
lated in Stephens's first case. Stephens v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn.
(Stephens II), No. C3-01-1772, 2002 WL 1315809, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June
18, 2002); see also Lee, 672 N.W.2d at 371 (finding that statutory claims are
not limited to certiorari review, but are within district court jurisdiction).
32. Stephens, 614 N.W.2d at 773-74.
33. Id. at 769-71.
34. See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (describ-
ing exhaustion of administrative remedies as a "judicial doctrine").
35. The following cases trace the U.S. Supreme Court's early exhaustion
jurisprudence: United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904); Prentis v. At-
lantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908); United States v. Abilene & S. Ry.
Co., 265 U.S. 274 (1924); FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160 (1927);
United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Natural Gas Pipe-
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a plaintiff must exhaust the appropriate administrative process
before filing an action for judicial review. 36
The exhaustion doctrine serves two primary functions: rec-
ognizing agency autonomy and promoting judicial efficiency.
Disallowing circumvention of administrative procedures pre-
serves agency authority by encouraging people to respect
agency rules and decisions.3 7 Protection of agency authority is
particularly compelling when agency decision making involves
either the exercise of powers delegated by the legislature or the
application of special expertise not within the conventional ex-
perience of judges. 38 Agencies are given the first chance to exer-
cise discretion or apply expertise precisely because of the body
of experience and knowledge they amass over time.39
The exhaustion doctrine furthers efficiency interests by al-
lowing agencies to correct their own errors before involving the
judiciary. Judicial economy is most obviously served by reduc-
ing court docket loads; a favorable decision for a claimant keeps
the dispute out of the courts entirely.40 But agencies also play
an important fact-finding role. When a claimant exercises the
right to judicial review after exhausting the available adminis-
trative remedies, courts benefit from the existing administra-
tive record. 41 Additionally, judicial deference to administrative
remedies serves efficiency by ensuring a more uniform ap-
proach to issues within an agency's jurisdiction.42 Allowing
various courts to concurrently interpret an agency's policies
may result in conflicting and confusing opinions.
line Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding,
303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (formally referring to the rule requiring exhaustion
for the first time).
36. Myers, 303 U.S. at 50-51.
37. McKart, 395 U.S. at 193-94.
38. Id. at 194; see also Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645,
654 (1973) ("[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional ex-
perience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion,
agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be
passed over.") (quoting Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-
75 (1952)).
39. McKart, 395 U.S. at 195.
40. Id.
41. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992), superseded by statute
as stated in Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2004). According to
the Court, this is particularly true when addressing a complex or technical is-
sue. Id.
42. See Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 654 (citing uniformity and consistency as
benefits of the exhaustion doctrine).
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Although the University of Minnesota is technically not an
administrative agency, the Stephens court was persuaded that
the university deserves an analogous level of autonomy.
43 Ac-
cording to the court, exhaustion of remedies is at least as im-
portant in the university context because of the unique grant of
constitutional authority bestowed upon the university and its
board of regents.44 The University of Minnesota was incorpo-
rated by the state constitution in 1857. 45 As a result, full con-
trol and management of the university's affairs rests with the
board of regents to the exclusion of the state legislature.
46 The
Stephens court reasoned that because the constitution placed
internal management of the university in the hands of the re-
gents alone, courts should not interfere with the board's exer-
cise of authority until its internal review processes are ex-
hausted or unless it has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. 47 The
court was concerned that allowing employees direct access to
43. Stephens v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 614 N.W.2d 764, 774
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000). According to the court, "[t]he University of Minne-
sota... is not a mere administrative agency-it is much more than that." Id.
In the 1952 case of State ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minnesota, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court was careful to distinguish the university from an admin-
istrative agency, the latter of which it described as an "organ of government"
born of legislative will. 54 N.W.2d 122, 126 (Minn. 1952). Instead, the Sholes
court analogized the university to a corporate body, with the board of regents
acting as the corporate board of directors. Id. at 127. Along these lines, the
court applied a doctrine "common to the law of corporations," requiring a pri-
vate corporate shareholder to exhaust all the means within the corporation
itself before instituting litigation for redress of any grievance. Id. at 127-28.
Arguing that Sholes applied the functional equivalent of the administrative
exhaustion doctrine, the Stephens court cited Sholes as authority for its hold-
ing. Stephens, 614 N.W.2d at 771-73.
44. Stephens, 614 N.W.2d at 774.
45. Winberg v. Univ. of Minn., 499 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Minn. 1993).
46. See generally State ex rel. Univ. of Minn. v. Chase, 220 N.W. 951, 953
(Minn. 1928) (describing the constitutional authority bestowed upon the uni-
versity). In the 1931 case of Fanning v. University of Minnesota, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court commented that "although the powers of the regents are
not subject to legislative or executive control, the university is not above the
law." 236 N.W. 217, 219 (Minn. 1931). See generally Michael J. Sherman, How
Free Is Free Enough? Public University Presidential Searches, University
Autonomy, and State Open Meeting Acts, 26 J.C. & U.L. 665, 677-87 (2000)
(documenting substantial judicial and nonjudicial support for university inde-
pendence from the legislature, particularly in reference to academic matters
like curriculum selection); cf. RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND TENURE: ETHICAL ISSUES 60-61 (1997) (arguing that the university is
properly autonomous in the areas in which its epistemic authority is appropri-
ate and decisive).
47. See Stephens, 614 N.W.2d at 774.
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the judicial system would "weaken the constitutional authority
of the institution."48
According to Stephens, application of the exhaustion doc-
trine to the university grievance process further aids in promot-
ing judicial efficiency.49 As in the administrative setting, the
grievance procedure may keep disputes out of court entirely; if
not, reviewing courts still benefit from the evidentiary record
developed in the process.50 Under the UGP, Phase III panels
are specifically responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings
and acting as finders of fact.51 Upon completion of each hear-
ing, panel members prepare a statement documenting theirfindings, as well as the issues, contentions of the parties, opin-
ion, and award.5 2 Certiorari review of a Phase III panel deci-
sion by the Minnesota Court of Appeals is limited to the record
developed by the panelists. 53
Notably, courts have not uniformly required compliance
with the exhaustion doctrine in the administrative context
unless statutorily mandated. 54 Without an express statutory
requirement, whether to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a matter of judicial discretion.55 Courts typically
apply a balancing test, weighing the interests of the individual
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. UGP, supra note 21, § 8(1). Phase III three-person panels include one
member of the University Grievance Board chosen by the grievant, one dele-gate of the senior administrator of the unit in which the grievant is employed,
and one hearing officer of the same employee category as the grievant (faculty,
administrative, etc.) to be selected by the university grievance officer. Id.§ 8(2). The hearing officer presides over the Phase III hearing. Id. § 8(5). Thegrievant and the university representative each have the right to peremptorily
challenge the person selected as hearing officer. Id. § 8(3). A majority of panel-ists is required to reach a decision. Id. § 8(5).
52. Id. Financial awards are generally limited to back pay and benefits
actually lost. Id. § 10(9). The UGP does not allow compensation for fees and
expenses of advocates, pain and suffering, emotional distress, penalties, or
punitive damages. Id.
53. Minnesota regulations provide that an appellate court shall rely upon
a record comprised of the papers, exhibits, and transcripts of any testimony
considered by the panel. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 110.01; see also MINN. R.CIV. ApP. P. 115.04 (instructing that Rule 110 should be applied to certiorari
proceedings to the extent possible).
54. See Kevin W. Reese, Administrative Remedies Must Be Exhausted Ab-
sent Circumstances Supporting an Exception Exhaustion Doctrine, 47 S.C. L.
REV. 17, 22 (1995).
55. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992), supersededby statute as stated in Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2004).
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against the policies favoring exhaustion. 56 A court electing not
to apply the doctrine where an administrative procedure exists
typically turns to one of several broad categories of excep-
tions.57
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, exceptions to the ex-
haustion doctrine may be placed into three categories. 58 First, a
claimant may be allowed to circumvent the administrative
process and go directly to court when the exhaustion require-
ment would cause undue prejudice to a subsequent assertion of
a court action. 59 For example, prejudice might result from an
unreasonable or indefinite timeframe for administrative action
that would conflict with a statute of limitations.60 Second, an
agency's lack of authority or inability to provide adequate relief
may prompt an exception. 6 1 Under this category, the Court of-
fers the example of an agency that is unable to consider
whether to grant relief because of a lack of institutional compe-
tence to resolve a particular type of issue, such as the constitu-
tionality of a statute. 62 A third exception may arise when the
adequacy of the administrative procedure itself is challenged,
as opposed to the merits of a particular decision.
63
In comparison, the Stephens court acknowledged only a
single exception to exhaustion of the University of Minnesota's
grievance procedure for cases where exhaustion would prove
56. Id. at 146. Depending on the specific facts of each case, courts might
rely upon the interests of justice, the need to correct an emergency, or the ex-
istence of undefined exceptional circumstances. See Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaus-
tion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from Environmental Cases, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1984).
57. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146-49 (listing "undue prejudice to subse-
quent assertion of a court action," "doubt as to whether the agency was em-
powered to grant defective relief," and "where the administrative body is
shown to be biased" as categories of exceptions).
58. Id. According to critics, the breadth of these categories is negatively
compounded by a lack of judicially imparted definition. See Gelpe, supra note
56, at 25-31 (urging consistent application of the exhaustion doctrine).
59. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146-47; see also Bowen v. City of New York,
476 U.S. 467 (1986) (allowing court action when Social Security procedure
would have caused delay and increased illness); Lawrence v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588 (1927) (acknowledging exception for "irrepara-
ble injury").
60. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147.
61. See id. at 147-48.
62. Id.; see also Reid v. Engen, 765 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1985) ("We
may decide an issue not raised in an agency action if the agency lacked either
the power or the jurisdiction to decide it.").
63. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 148-49.
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futile.64 In fact, Stephens tried to persuade the court that it
would have been futile for her to exhaust the remedies avail-
able to her under the UGP.65 She asserted that no disinterested
person could be impaneled to hear her grievance because any
hearing panelist would be directly or indirectly responsible to
President Yudof or to the board of regents. 66 The court of ap-
peals disagreed, finding that the panel selection process and
university grievance policy statement that "[n]o panelist shall
have a direct interest in the grievance" properly safeguarded
against a conflict of interest.67 Furthermore, the court stated
that Stephens's position would lead to the untenable conclusion
that the pursuit of any grievance involving the university's
president must be futile.68
While the Stephens court may have established a general
principle of exhaustion for employment claims against the uni-
versity, it failed to resolve some of the specifics. In particular,
the court declined to answer the question of whether a claimant
could proceed too far within the university grievance process
and foreclose the opportunity for any judicial review by subject-
ing a claim to Phase IV, which calls for final and binding arbi-
tration. 69 The opinion's final footnote explains that:
Because Stephens failed to exhaust any phase of the university's
grievance process, we do not address whether a party would be pre-
cluded from seeking judicial review before exhausting "Phase IV" ar-
bitration in which a grievant agrees to binding arbitration and pur-
portedly "waive[s] and release[s] all rights to pursue substantially the
same claim in any other forum."70
The court of appeals left this question unanswered until Uni-
versity of Minnesota v. Woolley. 71
C. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA V. WOOLLEY
In 2003, the Minnesota Court of Appeals picked up where
Stephens left off. The university terminated Woolley, a physi-
cian at the university's student health clinic, for sexually har-
64. Stephens v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 614 N.W.2d 764, 775(Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 776.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 776 n.8.
70. Id. (citation omitted).
71. 659 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
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assing one of the health service employees. 72 Because the Phase
I meeting between Woolley and the administrator responsible
for his termination failed to resolve the issue, Woolley pro-
ceeded to a Phase II meeting with the supervisor of the admin-
istrator responsible for his termination. 73 This second meeting
also failed to resolve the issue. 74 Woolley then proceeded to a
Phase III hearing before a three-person panel.75 Because the
Phase III panel sustained Woolley's termination, he proceeded
to Phase IV arbitration before an arbitration panel selected
pursuant to university guidelines.76 After the arbitration panel
issued an opinion denying Woolley's grievance, Woolley at-
tempted to challenge the merits of the arbitration decision by
filing for writ of certiorari.77
Woolley argued that he had exhausted the remedies avail-
able to him, in accordance with Stephens, and therefore de-
served review by certiorari. 78 The university argued that certio-
rari review is not available from arbitration proceedings,
which, pursuant to the MUAA, are final and binding on the
parties. 79 Under the MUAA, a party who agrees to arbitration
has limited rights of judicial review, not including direct judi-
72. Id. at 302.
73. Id. at 302-03; see also supra note 30 (describing the four phases of the
UGP). The purpose of the Phase II meeting, which consists of an informal
meeting between the grievant and the administrator or supervisor of the per-
son responsible for the action being grieved, is "to facilitate resolution by in-
forming and involving higher University administration." UGP, supra note 21,
§ 7(1).
74. Woolley, 659 N.W.2d at 302-03.
75. Id.; see also supra notes 30 and 51 (describing Phase III panel).
76. Woolley, 659 N.W.2d at 303; see also supra note 30 (noting that when
a grievant is dissatisfied with the decision of a Phase III panel, he or she may
proceed to Phase IV arbitration). To proceed to arbitration, the grievant must
sign an agreement waiving and releasing all rights to pursue the same claim
in any other forum. UGP, supra note 21, § 8(8). A three-person panel oversees
arbitration. See id. § 9(2). The panel is comprised of an arbitrator, a member of
the University Grievance Board selected by the grievant, and a senior admin-
istrator. Id. In cases involving faculty or academic professional and adminis-
trative staff, arbitrators must be non-Minnesota residents, members of the
National Academy of Arbitrators, and persons holding either tenured faculty
rank or emeritus status at a U.S. university outside of Minnesota. Id. Accord-
ing to the UGP, the grievant and the university are each responsible for one-
half of the arbitrator's fees and expenses. Id. § 9(5).
77. Woolley, 659 N.W.2d at 303.
78. Id. at 307.
79. Id. at 307-09. Although the UGP has no direct reference to the
MUAA, UGP text repeatedly refers to the arbitration decisions as final and
binding upon the parties. UGP, supra note 21, §§ 8(8), 9(1), 9(4).
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cial review of an administrative body's decision.8 0 The court
agreed with the university. It affirmed Stephens by recognizing
that the university's grievance process must be exhausted be-
fore seeking judicial review, but it limited certiorari review to
Phase III panel decisions.81 Because a Phase IV arbitration de-
cision is not subject to judicial review, a party must seek review
by certiorari upon completion of Phase 111.82 Woolley lost his
chance to obtain certiorari review when he proceeded to Phase
IV arbitration from the Phase III hearing.8 3
The central issue in Woolley was whether the decisions fol-
lowing Phase III panel hearings or Phase IV arbitration pro-
ceedings should be subject to certiorari review.8 4 A 1999 case
had already confirmed that writ of certiorari is the appropriate
method of review for a University of Minnesota employee's
challenge to an adverse employment decision.8 5 Because certio-
rari is an extremely deferential form of judicial review and
gives a distinct advantage to the university in this context, it is
worth exploring the reasoning behind its application.
D. REVIEW BY CERTIORARI
It is a tenet of administrative law in Minnesota that "in the
absence of an adequate method of review or legal remedy, judi-
cial review of the quasi-judicial decisions of administrative bod-
ies, if available, must be invoked by writ of certiorari."8 6 Certio-
80. Woolley, 659 N.W.2d at 308-09. For a list of rights of judicial review
available upon arbitration proceedings, see MINN. STAT. §§ 572.18, 572.19,
572.20, 572.26 (2002).
81. Woolley, 659 N.W.2d at 306.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 303. Several cases previously established that termination of a
public employee is a quasi-judicial decision. See, e.g., Mowry v. Young, 565
N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn. 1997) (holding the same and listing cases). See infra
notes 101-04 and accompanying text for a three-part test to determine
whether an action constitutes a quasi-judicial decision.
85. Shaw v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 594 N.W.2d 187, 191(Minn. Ct. App. 1999); see also Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 241
(Minn. 1992).
86. Dietz, 487 N.W.2d at 239. State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education is
one of the earliest cases addressing this issue in Minnesota. 7 N.W.2d 544(Minn. 1942), overruled on another point of law by Foesch v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 646, 223 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1974). In Ging, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that certiorari is the only method for review of school board decisions be-
cause a school board, as a derivative of the executive branch, should enjoy a
"wide field wherein their decision, even though wrong, is final." Id. at 556
(quoting Lindquist v. Abbett, 265 N.W. 54, 57 (Minn. 1936)). To hold otherwise
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rari mandates nonintrusive and expedient judicial review in
order to maintain fundamental separation of powers princi-
ples.8 7 Central to its application in the administrative context
are the requirements that there be no other prescribed method
of review or legal remedy and that the challenged administra-
tive action constitute a quasi-judicial decision.88
Certiorari review is limited and deferential in nature. It is
limited to an inspection of the record of the inferior tribunal,8 9
which is comprised of the papers, exhibits, and transcripts of
any testimony considered by the body whose decision is being
reviewed. 90 The petitioner on appeal has the heavy burden of
demonstrating that the agency's order or determination was
"arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an er-
roneous theory of law, or without any evidence to support it."91
The scope of review also extends to questions affecting the
regularity of the proceedings.92 Some critics argue that given
this deference, certiorari is only appropriate for cases involving
detailed records, and that claimants should be granted direct
access to the district courts when a record is deemed insuffi-
cient.93 Minnesota courts, however, hold that an incomplete re-
cord does not change writ of certiorari as the appropriate
method of review.94
and allow potentially searching review would result in an unconstitutional in-
vasion of the school board's decision-making process. See Dietz, 487 N.W.2d at
239. It would also compromise the executive body's efficient operation. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Zahavy v. Univ. of Minn., 544 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996),
impliedly overruled on another point of law as recognized by Shaw, 594
N.W.2d 187.
90. See supra note 53.
91. Manteuffel v. City of North St. Paul, 538 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995); see also Zahavy, 544 N.W.2d at 36.
92. Zahavy, 544 N.W.2d at 36.
93. See, e.g., Dietz, 487 N.W.2d at 241 (Gardebring, J., dissenting) ("Al-
though I agree that administrative decisions made by the executive branch of
government are entitled to deference, I believe the decision in this case exalts
form over substance and effectively denies persons in appellant's position any
meaningful appellate review."). In addition to the deferential standard of re-
view, the dissent complained that the sixty-day deadline to petition for certio-
rari was particularly harsh and resulted in inefficiency. Id.; see also El
Ghandour v. Univ. of Minn., No. C2-02-834, at 3 (Minn. Ct. App., June 20,
2002) (order denying certiorari) ("Even if relator was not required to exhaust
her administrative remedies, this appeal is untimely because the writ of cer-
tiorari was not issued and served within 60 days after relator received due no-
tice of the ... termination decision.").
94. Shaw v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 594 N.W.2d 187, 192
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Most likely due to its limited nature, certiorari review is
only available when no other adequate method of review or
remedy exists. 95 As a result, most courts decline to extend cer-
tiorari to claims involving statutory causes of action.96 This
limitation expresses courts' concerns regarding the erosion of a
claimant's statutory rights. It also acknowledges that when the
legislature explicitly provides for a cause of action appealing an
administrative action in district court, the separation of powers
problem that typically arises from judicial review of adminis-
trative agency decisions has been resolved in favor of the
courts.
9 7
In Stephens, for example, the court held that certiorari re-
view of Stephens's claim alleging bankruptcy discrimination
would not be appropriate because the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vided a statutory cause of action for redress of her allegation. 98
In contrast, no statute specifically permits an appeal from a de-
cision to terminate a university employee. 99 Without a statute
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999); see also Dokmo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 459 N.W.2d
671, 676 (Minn. 1990) ("While a record is essential to review by writ of certio-
rari, there is no statutory or other requirement that there must be a hearing
in order to create an adequate record. The burden of making a record, like the
burden of proof, falls on the [agency]."). If the record is lacking, on writ of cer-
tiorari the court of appeals may determine that the agency has not "met its
burden of proving substantial evidence supporting its decision or the case may
[be] remanded for additional findings." Id. at 677. Even so, there is no question
that certiorari is the only type of review available for quasi-judicial decisions
of administrative bodies. See Shaw, 594 N.W.2d at 192.
95. State ex rel. Ging v. Bd. of Educ., 7 N.W.2d 544, 556 (Minn. 1942),
overruled on another point of law by Foesch v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 646, 223
N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1974) ("It is significant that the tenure act itself gives no
right of appeal, leaving a discharged teacher only the right to review by a pre-
rogative writ .... ").
96. See, e.g., Willis v. County of Sherburne, 555 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Minn.
1996) (distinguishing petitioner's wrongful discharge claim from his allega-
tions of disability discrimination). While the former claim was confined to lim-
ited review by the court of appeals via writ of certiorari, petitioner's claim al-
leging disability discrimination could be brought in district court by virtue of a
statutory right to bring a civil action pursuant to the Minnesota Human
Rights Act. Id.; Stephens v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 614 N.W.2d
764, 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that when a party has a statutory
cause of action by which to pursue a claimed statutory violation by the univer-
sity, review of that claim is beyond the scope of certiorari review).
97. See Manteuffel v. City of North St. Paul, 538 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1995).
98. Stephens, 614 N.W.2d at 771.
99. Shaw, 594 N.W.2d at 191. This is particularly true given that the uni-
versity is not subject to the Minnesota Administrative Procedures Act
(MAPA), which governs rule-making and appellate procedures for all state-
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providing a mechanism for university employees to appeal ter-
minations or other adverse employment actions, certiorari is
the only method available for review of a university decision. 10 0
The scope of certiorari is further confined in the adminis-
trative context to appeals from quasi-judicial decisions of ad-
ministrative bodies. 10 1 The Minnesota Supreme Court has es-
tablished three indicia of quasi-judicial actions.10 2 First, the
proceeding must involve an "investigation into a disputed claim
and weighing of evidentiary facts"; second, "application of those
facts to a prescribed standard"; and third, the proceeding must
result in "a binding decision regarding the disputed claim."'
10 3
Failure to meet any of the three indicia is "fatal" to a claim that
the proceedings were quasi-judicial. 10 4
Regarding the first requirement, Minnesota case law indi-
cates that an inherent conflict of interest may remove an ad-
ministrative body's decision from the purview of certiorari.
1°5
For example, it may be inappropriate for the court to rely on
the fact-finding functions of an administrative body whose own
conduct is the subject of dispute, as in an employment dis-
crimination case.' 0 6 Minnesota courts have held that claimants
are not bound by the findings of an administrative body in
cases presenting inherent conflicts of interest without a full
wide administrative agencies. MINN. STAT. Ch. 14 (2002); see also Shaw, 594
N.W.2d at 191.
100. Shaw, 594 N.W.2d at 191. But cf. supra note 31 (citing Lee as an ex-
ceptional case).
101. Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992).
102. Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Metro. Council, 587 N.W.2d 838, 842
(Minn. 1999).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 844.
105. See Manteuffel v. City of North St. Paul, 538 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a deferential standard of review is inappropriate
where the court is asked to determine whether the city itself violated the law,
as opposed to whether the city had cause to terminate the plaintiff); see also
Graham v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 472 N.W.2d 114, 118-20 (Minn. 1991)
(holding that a school board's findings of fact should not have collateral estop-
pel effect when the school board was evaluating the lawfulness of its own con-
duct as an employer).
106. See Graham, 472 N.W.2d at 118-20 (differentiating between a public
employer's right to use discretion in evaluating the performance or conduct of
an employee and a situation in which the employer is left to decide the lawful-
ness of its own conduct as the employer); see also Manteuffel, 538 N.W.2d at
730-31 (discussing Graham and subsequent cases that address whether an
"administrative body can fairly adjudicate the propriety of its own conduct").
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and fair hearing. 0 7 Even with the requisite procedural safe-
guards, such claims may still be beyond the scope of certiorari
review. 108
The court's analysis in Woolley hinged upon the third re-
quirement, specifically, whether Phase III or Phase IV pro-
duced a quasi-judicial decision subject to certiorari review.10 9
According to the Woolley court, Phase III panel hearings easily
pass the first two elements of the three-part test.110 The more
difficult question for the court was whether a Phase III decision
is final and binding."' The court dwelled on the fact that the
university policy lacks any language specifically informing a
grievant that by electing to proceed to Phase IV he or she will
be abandoning the right to seek review by certiorari of a Phase
III decision. 112 Furthermore, there are repeated references
throughout the grievance policy to Phase IV as a final and
binding decision.113 Despite this ambiguity, the court in Wool-
ley concluded that the policy's language sufficiently put the
grievant on notice that upon conclusion of Phase III his in-
volvement with an internal process was at an end and that re-
view of a final administrative proceeding was available to
him. 114 After concluding that Phase III produces a final admin-
istrative decision, the court held that review by writ of certio-
rari is available upon completion of Phase III proceedings.1' 5
Phase IV arbitration, on the other hand, is governed by the
MUAA.116 A party who agrees to Phase IV arbitration has ex-
tremely limited rights of review, not including review by certio-
rari." 7
Both Woolley and Stephens rely upon doctrine and review
mechanisms designed for administrative agencies. While this
may not be misguided per se, such reliance is problematic con-
107. See Graham, 472 N.W.2d at 119-20.
108. See Manteuffel, 538 N.W.2d at 731.
109. Univ. of Minn. v. Woolley, 659 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 304.
112. Id. at 306.
113. Id. at 30506.
114. Id. at 306.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 308.
117. See id. at 308 (citing Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d
901, 906 (Minn. 1996), for the proposition that an employee's decision to enter
arbitration proceedings amounts to a waiver of broader rights to judicial re-
view).
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sidering that the University of Minnesota is not itself an ad-
ministrative agency, 118 and that pre-established judicial struc-
tures like exhaustion and certiorari review were not intended
for informal employee grievance processes like the UGP. 119 Part
II of this Note addresses potential problems arising from this
mismatch: first, application of low-level review is not justified
by the same policy considerations that support exhaustion and
certiorari in the administrative context; second, the university
is not subject to the same checks and balances as an adminis-
trative agency; and third, due to the relative informality of the
UGP, there are fewer procedural safeguards for plaintiffs.
II. MISMATCHED: EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES, CERTIORARI REVIEW, AND THE
UNIVERSITY GRIEVANCE PROCESS
A. EXAMINING THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING
EXHAUSTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA GRIEVANCE PROCESS
Exhaustion of remedies and certiorari review are appropri-
ate for the administrative context. In particular, the decisions
and fact-finding functions of administrative agencies deserve
deferential treatment because of agency expertise in a particu-
lar area. 120 Take, for example, the federal Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA). Experts working for the EPA are able to
gather, process, and evaluate information related to environ-
mental regulations more quickly and economically than a
court. 121 Because the EPA's personnel includes highly trained
scientists, engineers, and lawyers, the Agency's factual deter-
minations are also likely to be more accurate. 122 Increased effi-
118. See supra note 43.
119. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text (explaining that the ex-
haustion doctrine developed out of and was designed for the administrative
context).
120. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969); see also
Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 654 (1973) ("[In cases rais-
ing issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases re-
quiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress
for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over." (quoting Far E.
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952))).
121. See Gelpe, supra note 56, at 17 (referring to experts in general).
122. See id. at 19 (describing the professional qualifications of EPA person-
nel and arguing that an initial factual determination by an agency is less im-
portant if the agency's personnel lacks real expertise).
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ciency and accuracy, by virtue of the Agency's expertise, weigh
heavily in favor of the courts' hands-off approach to agency de-
cision making. 123
The same argument does not hold up in the employment
context. While an employer may understand the nuances of its
business better than a court, it is not necessarily in the best po-
sition to determine whether it breached an employment con-
tract or discriminated against an employee. 124 Courts, not em-
ployers, are skilled and practiced in making these
determinations and hence more likely to make efficient and ac-
curate assessments of a grievant's claim. 125 Furthermore,
courts offer neutrality where an employer would otherwise be
charged with determining its own liability.126 An employer is
likely to be conflicted when deciding employment discrimina-
tion claims in a way the EPA reviewing a decision to grant a
variance from the Clean Air Act is not. To the extent that there
is an inherent conflict in any internal grievance mechanism,
extraordinary agency expertise and concomitant gains in effi-
ciency justify exhaustion and the limits it imposes on griev-
ants.127 Without the same level of expertise or increase in accu-
racy, exhaustion still creates a more efficient process by
keeping claims out of court. It seems less justifiable, however,
to bar a grievant from court for the sole reason of reducing
docket loads. 128
123. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
124. See Graham v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 472 N.W.2d 114, 118-20
(Minn. 1991) (differentiating between a public employer's right to use discre-
tion in evaluating the performance or conduct of an employee and a situation
in which the employer is left to decide the lawfulness of its own conduct as the
employer); cf. Manteuffel v. City of North St. Paul, 538 N.W.2d 727, 729
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a deferential standard of review is inap-
propriate when the court is asked to determine whether the city itself violated
the law, as opposed to whether the city had cause to terminate the plaintiff).
125. Cf. DE GEORGE, supra note 46, at 60 (arguing that the university is
properly autonomous in the areas in which its epistemic authority is appropri-
ate and decisive).
126. See supra note 124.
127. See Reese, supra note 54, at 20 (noting that, in fact, one of the advan-
tages of exhaustion is that it provides agencies an opportunity to correct their
own errors).
128. See Gelpe, supra note 56, at 23 (agreeing with commentators thatjudges invoke the exhaustion doctrine to help them dispose of cases and alle-
viate calendar pressures); cf. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195
(1969) (commenting that a favorable decision for a claimant in an administra-
tive proceeding may keep the dispute out of the courts entirely).
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The court's holding in Stephens was largely based on its
view that the university deserves at least the same degree of
autonomy as an administrative agency. 129 Under the Minnesota
Constitution, the university's board of regents, which operates
much like a corporate board of directors, is granted authority to
manage the university relatively free of judicial or legislative
intervention. 130 The court may have been correct in assuming
that the university was bestowed with greater authority than
an administrative agency typically wields,' 3 ' as an administra-
tive agency's authority is subject to more checks from the legis-
lature. 13 2 For example, the legislature may employ numerous
mechanisms to express disapproval with an agency's prac-
tices. 133 Aside from reducing appropriations, the legislature
might exert control by structuring reporting mechanisms, re-
quiring legislative review of new agency rules and regulations,
or applying a variety of political pressures. 34 While close sur-
veillance may not be the norm, the legislature still has the
power to monitor and sanction an agency if need be. In con-
trast, the university and its board of regents exist in greater
isolation.135
The fact that the university is bestowed with more author-
ity and thereby exists in greater isolation than an administra-
tive agency may actually counteract the argument for exhaus-
tion of remedies and certiorari in the university context.
Because an administrative agency's authority is checked by
more intense legislative scrutiny, internal grievance mecha-
nisms are less prone to abuse. Courts may more appropriately
defer to agency determinations when assured that grievants'
procedural and substantive rights will be protected throughout
informal proceedings by legislative oversight. Without an
equivalent arrangement in the university setting, grievants'
rights are arguably more at risk.
129. See Stephens v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 614 N.W.2d 764,
774 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); see also supra note 43.
130. See Stephens, 614 N.W.2d at 774; see also supra notes 45-46 and ac-
companying text.
131. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
132. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ET AL., 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS § 3.1, at 42-46 (3d ed. 1999).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 42.
135. See supra note 130. The judicial and legislative branches are only
given license to intervene in cases where the board has clearly exceeded its
jurisdiction. See Stephens, 614 N.W.2d at 773-74.
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The gains in efficiency and agency autonomy that support
exhaustion and certiorari review in the administrative context
are only justified when grievants' rights are not unduly bur-
dened in the process. 136 Whenever a plaintiffs recourse for al-
leged wrongdoing is taken out of the courtroom and restricted
to less formal proceedings, there is a risk of unfairness result-
ing from fewer procedural safeguards.137 Because employees
appealing Phase III hearings are limited to certiorari review
and those proceeding to Phase IV arbitration effectively lose
their right to seek any judicial review, it is important to ask
whether the grievance process is a fair substitute for an ag-
grieved employee's day in court. 138 Along these lines, two as-
pects of the UGP deserve specific consideration: the remedies
available to university employees under the UGP and the pol-
icy's statute of limitations.
B. A QUESTION OF FAIRNESS: DISCREPANCY IN REMEDIES AND
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
An employee may see a difference between the remedies
available to him in court and those available under the UGP.Both Phase III and Phase IV panels lack the authority to com-
pensate for fees and other advocate expenses, pain and suffer-
ing, emotional distress, penalties, or punitive damages.139 In-
stead, grievants are limited to back pay and benefits actually
lost, together with reinstatement. 140 Had Stephens brought her
claims asserting retaliation, defamation, and violation of uni-
versity policy in district court, she may have been entitled to a
broader array of remedies, including compensatory and puni-
tive damages.141 In fact, all of the remedies barred by the UGP
136. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (describing gains in ef-ficiency and agency autonomy afforded by application of the exhaustion doc-trine). But see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (explaining that theSupreme Court's balancing test instructs courts to consider the exhaustion
doctrine's impact on individuals' interests).
137. See, e.g., Mary Rowe, Dispute Resolution in the Non-Union Environ-
ment, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 79, 80 (Sandra E. Gleason ed., 1997) (citing the absence or
risk of sufficient due process protection as a frequently observed shortcoming
of internal grievance and appeal channels).
138. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (describing the holdingin Stephens); supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (describing the hold-
ing in Woolley).
139. UGP, supra note 21, § 10(9).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 259
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are characteristic of tort claims. 142 Under this scheme, any
grievant with a tort-based employment claim may be denied
the full assortment of remedies otherwise available to a suc-
cessful plaintiff. In addition to Stephens's claims listed above,
examples of tort-based employment claims include fraud, mis-
representation, tortious interference with contract, wrongful
termination, and infliction of emotional distress. 143 There is no
indication from the UGP, Stephens, or Woolley that tort-based
employment law claims are exempt from the dual requirements
of exhaustion and certiorari.
144
Claimants under the UGP are further limited by the time-
lines for filing grievances and appealing Phase III panel deci-
sions. Both the UGP and writ of certiorari timelines are sub-
stantially shorter than most statutes of limitations. The UGP
prescribes a thirty-day window for the filing of employee griev-
ances, 45 even though a general two-year statute of limitations
period applies to most employment actions under Minnesota
law. 46 The UGP declines to extend the thirty-day filing dead-
line to mirror applicable statutes of limitations.
147
Minnesota courts have similarly upheld rules requiring is-
suance of a writ of certiorari by the court of appeals within
sixty days of the decision being appealed. 148 Despite incongru-
ence with otherwise applicable statutes of limitations, an em-
ployee's failure to seek relief within this relatively short period
(Minn. 1980) (noting that compensatory and punitive damages are available in
a defamation action).
142. See STEPHEN F. BEFORT, 17 EMPLOYMENT LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 11.10-.27 (2d ed. 2003) (describing tort claims and potential remedies avail-
able to a discharged employee).
143. See id.
144. Thus far, Minnesota courts have only recognized statutory claims as
being exempt from exhaustion and certiorari. See Stephens v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Minn. (Stephens II), No. C3-01-1772, 2002 WL 1315809 at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. June 18, 2000); see also Lee v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn.
672 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that statutory claims are
not limited to certiorari review, but are within district court jurisdiction).
145. UGP, supra note 21, § 5(1).
146. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 541.07(1) (2002) (applying two-year statute of
limitations to tort claims); MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (2002) (actions for recovery
of wages to be commenced within two years).
147. See UGP, supra note 21, § 5(1). This is true for nonstatutory claims
that would otherwise fall under the statute of limitations, but not statutory
claims which are exempt from the requirements of exhaustion and certiorari.
See supra note 144.
148. See Dokmo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671, 677-78 (Minn.
1990).
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of time is a jurisdictional basis for dismissal.149 The courts' in-
sistence upon prompt judicial review from agency decisions is
another example of judicial deference to quasi-judicial agency
decision making.150 In addition to the deference accorded by the
standard of review under certiorari, review is limited to an in-
spection of the record, however incomplete, and places a heavy
burden on the challenging party.15 1 Critics argue that the trun-
cated timeline for filing a claim is unnecessarily harsh given
the amount of deference already accorded to agency deci-
sions. 152
Any limitations on otherwise available remedies or stat-
utes of limitations are significant because they arguably com-
promise plaintiffs' substantive rights. In another context, the
U.S. Supreme Court has upheld forum selection clauses bind-
ing employees to arbitration with the limitation that plaintiffs'
substantive rights, including remedies and statutes of limita-
tions, remain intact.153 Although the UGP does not technically
include a mandatory arbitration clause-employees are not lim-
ited to arbitration but may elect to proceed to arbitration after
seeking review from a Phase III panel 154-- there are some key
similarities. For example, an employee filing under the UGP
essentially loses access to the courts, with the limited exception
of extremely deferential certiorari review of a Phase III panel
decision, just like an employee who must arbitrate claims
against an employer instead of pursuing remedies in court. 155
Because of the limitations faced by university employees who
must defend their claims in Phase III panel and Phase IV arbi-
149. See id. at 677-78; see also In re Termination of Gay, 555 N.W.2d 29,31 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that actual service of the issued writ mustbe accomplished within sixty days in order to vest jurisdiction in the court of
appeals).
150. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
152. See Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Minn. 1992) (Garde-bring, J., dissenting) (commenting that the sixty-day deadline to petition for
certiorari is particularly harsh and does not result in efficiency); see also
BEFORT, supra note 142, §12.42.
153. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
154. See UGP, supra note 21, § 8(7).
155. After Stephens, a university employee challenging an adverse em-ployment decision may only access the courts after exhausting the university'sinternal remedies, and even then, the employee will most likely be limited to
writ of certiorari. See Stephens v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 614
N.W.2d 764, 775-76 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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tration hearings, preservation of plaintiffs' substantive rights is
equally important in the context of the UGP.
III. ENSURING JUSTICE THROUGH EXCEPTIONS
Differences between administrative agencies and the uni-
versity, 156 as well as concerns regarding the level of deference
under certiorari review, 157 support recognition of a wider range
of exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. 158 In Stephens, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals rightly recognized an exception for
futility.159 The U.S. Supreme Court's three categories of excep-
tions, however, are broader and better equipped to address con-
cerns regarding procedural safeguards and the relative infor-
mality of the grievance proceedings.160
A. APPLYING TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXHAUSTION
DOCTRINE IN THE UNIVERSITY SETTING
The U.S. Supreme Court allows exceptions to the exhaus-
tion doctrine when its application would cause undue prejudice,
when administrative agencies are unable to provide adequate
relief, or in case of procedural shortcomings of the administra-
tive proceedings themselves. 161 The Court has acknowledged
that undue prejudice may result from an unreasonable or in-
definite timeframe for administrative action that would conflict
with statutes of limitations. 62 As previously discussed, em-
ployees are limited by both the thirty-day initial filing period as
well as the sixty-day window for filing petitions for certiorari
review. 63 Granting an exception in each case of conflict with a
statute of limitations would essentially undo the exhaustion
and certiorari rules in the context of the UGP. Without taking
such an extreme position, it is noteworthy that the Court finds
156. See supra Part II.A.
157. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text for the full panoply of
exceptions allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
159. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. But see Gelpe, supra
note 56, at 25-26 (criticizing the Court's position on exceptions to the exhaus-
tion doctrine as well as application of a balancing test on the basis of inconsis-
tency).
161. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
162. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147 (1992), superseded by
statute as stated in Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2004).
163. See supra notes 148-52.
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it desirable that administrative grievance procedures not
threaten statutes of limitations.164
Moreover, the Court has only provided an outline of a per-
missive doctrine of exceptions-the ultimate determination is
to be made on a case-by-case basis.165 In the context of viable
tort claims where a claimant's remedies are also limited by ex-
haustion of the UGP, the relatively short timeline for filing a
claim may provide a more compelling reason to grant an excep-
tion. In fact, the Court has included an administrative entity's
inability to provide adequate relief as a justifiable reason for
granting an exception from the exhaustion doctrine.166 In the
context of the UGP, a grievant might argue that a tort-based
wrongful termination claim should be exempt from the exhaus-
tion requirements because of particularly egregious circum-
stances that merit punitive or other compensatory damages
disallowed by the university's policy.16 7
Under the Court's doctrine of exceptions, adequate relief
also refers to institutional competence to decide a particular
type of claim. 68 The decision by Minnesota courts to exempt
statutory claims from exhaustion and certiorari requirements
can at least partially be explained on the grounds of institu-
tional competence: In the case of statutorily codified causes of
action, courts are better equipped to fulfill the legislature's in-
tent by investigating and remedying alleged wrongdoing than
the university grievance mechanism.169
A grievant might argue that the university is equally ill
equipped to make decisions regarding the lawfulness of its own
conduct, as opposed to simply evaluating the performance or
conduct of an employee.170 For example, Stephens's allegations
164. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
166. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147.
167. Following the federal model, an exemption from the exhaustion re-quirement would allow an employee to bring an original cause of action in dis-
trict court. See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 203 (1969) (re-
manding the case to a lower court for judgment upon finding that thepetitioner qualified for exemption); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,303 U.S. 41, 53 (1938) (divesting the district court of jurisdiction where ex-haustion of administrative remedies is required). Obtaining original jurisdic-
tion in district court would further exempt the aggrieved employee from cer-
tiorari review.
168. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147-48.
169. See supra notes 47, 95-98.
170. See supra notes 105-08, 124 and accompanying text.
[89:510
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
of retaliatory conduct and violation of university policy would
potentially address the lawfulness of university actions more
than the conduct of Stephens herself. This argument spills over
into the third broad exception, which addresses the adequacy of
the grievance procedure.
17 1
B. RESTORING DISCRETION TO THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
While less efficient than the current bright-line rule re-
quiring exhaustion in all but the most extreme circumstances,
a discretionary approach to allowing exceptions to the exhaus-
tion doctrine is consistent with precedent from the administra-
tive context. 172 Under this approach, courts use discretion in
deciding whether to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies where not explicitly mandated by statute.1 73 The
three categories outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court would
serve as a model to Minnesota courts. 174 Within each category,
courts would apply a balancing test, weighing the interests of
the individual against the policies favoring exhaustion. This
balancing test, as traditionally adopted by courts, is necessary
to safeguard the interests of individual claimants. 75 This is
particularly important given that plaintiffs who are subject to
the exhaustion requirement essentially lose their day in court,
with the exception of limited certiorari review.
176
A discretionary approach is even more compelling in the
context of the university grievance process because the univer-
sity is subject to fewer checks from the legislature than an ad-
ministrative agency.177 Less deference should be afforded where
there are fewer procedural safeguards by virtue of the univer-
sity's isolation and autonomy. Furthermore, the doctrines of
exhaustion and certiorari were developed with classic adminis-
trative processes in mind, not informal in-house employer
grievance systems. 7 8 Because the university is not always in
171. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 148 (noting that "an administrative remedy
may be inadequate where the administrative body is shown to be biased or has
otherwise predetermined the issue before it").
172. See Reese, supra note 54, at 22.
173. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144-46.
174. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
176. See Stephens v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 614 N.W.2d 764,
775-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
177. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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the best position to determine whether it breached an employ-
ment contract or discriminated against an employee, courts
should be allowed to step in where increased accuracy, effi-
ciency, and fairness will be served.
CONCLUSION
Application of the exhaustion requirement to the employ-
ment setting is understandable given the rise in employment-
related litigation and the resulting proliferation of employment
grievance systems. Relegating claims to in-house procedures
makes sense from an efficiency perspective. However, courts
need to make sure that employees do not lose their day in court
when grievance processes cannot sufficiently protect or admin-
ister employee rights. A discretionary approach to the exhaus-
tion doctrine, wherein a broader range of exceptions are al-
lowed, will make up for losses in efficiency by producing gains
in fairness. Presumably, this type of balancing act is precisely
what the Supreme Court had in mind when it articulated its
broad doctrine of exceptions just over a decade ago.
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